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 II.-185 
TENTH CIRCUIT RULED IN FAVOR OF SEX-
PLUS-AGE CLAIMS OF DISCRIMINATION 
UNDER TITLE VII IN THE WAKE OF 
BOSTOCK v. CLAYTON COUNTY 
Abstract: On July 21, 2020, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in 
Frappied v. Affinity Gaming Black Hawk, LLC held that sex-plus-age discrimina-
tion claims are cognizable under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. By 
taking a stance on the viability of sex-plus-age claims, the Tenth Circuit became 
the first circuit court to weigh in on the debate among the lower courts. Many 
federal district courts, relying on the availability of the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act to address age discrimination claims, have rejected sex-plus-
age claims under Title VII. This Comment argues that the Tenth Circuit’s deci-
sion is sound policy and logically follows the Supreme Court’s recent ruling in 
Bostock v. Clayton County. 
INTRODUCTION 
Women experienced workplace discrimination well before Congress en-
acted statutes to prevent it, and they continue to experience it today.1 Workers 
over forty, whose employers often treat them less favorably than their younger 
counterparts, have similarly experienced discrimination.2 As such, women over 
forty in the workforce may experience a unique form of employment discrimi-
                                                                                                                      
 1 See Catherine Ross Dunham, Third Generation Discrimination: The Ripple Effects of Gender 
Bias in the Workplace, 51 AKRON L. REV. 55, 56 (2017) (noting that since Congress enacted Title 
VII, employment discrimination based on sex has changed and become less overt but still persists). 
Discrimination occurs when laws or accepted procedures bestow advantages on some people but not 
others “because of race, age, sex, nationality, religion, or disability.” Discrimination, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). The more subtle discrimination that women face in the workplace often 
happens when women enter into and compete in male-dominated industries, where people hold im-
plicit bias against women. See Dunham, supra, at 56–57 (describing a female Wal-Mart employee 
who was not promoted because her male managers, who had discretion over promotion decisions, 
relied on gender stereotypes that favored promoting male employees to managerial positions). 
 2 See Richard W. Johnson & Peter Gosselin, How Secure Is Employment at Older Ages?, URB. 
INST. 20 (Dec. 8, 2018), https://www.urban.org/research/publication/how-secure-employment-older-
ages/view/full_report [https://perma.cc/BJD2-EV7A] (finding that a worker’s employment becomes 
less secure as they age). Over half of fifty-one to fifty-four-year old full-time employees reported an 
involuntarily separation from their job after the age of fifty, which can have dire financial conse-
quences for those workers who were relying on additional years of work to support themselves and 
their families into retirement. See id. (indicating that older adults disproportionately experience un-
wanted periods of unemployment, and employers’ hesitance to hire older workers compounds this 
further). 
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nation that is distinct from a simple combination of sex discrimination and age 
discrimination.3 
When the Golden Mardi Gras Casino in Black Hawk, Colorado laid off 
about sixty workers in 2013, its decisions disproportionately affected older 
workers, particularly older women.4 Plaintiffs sued Affinity Gaming Black 
Hawk, LLC, the new owners of the casino, for sex and age discrimination un-
der Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA).5 The U.S. District Court for the District of Colora-
do dismissed the claims, in part because it did not find that plaintiffs could 
bring sex-plus-age claims under Title VII.6 On appeal, the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit in Frappied v. Affinity Gaming Black Hawk, LLC, in 
2020, became the first circuit court to take a stance on this issue when it re-
versed the lower court’s finding that Title VII sex-plus-age claims were not 
permissible.7 
                                                                                                                      
 3 See Nicole Buonocore Porter, Sex Plus Age Discrimination: Protecting Older Women Workers, 
81 DENV. U. L. REV. 79, 94–97 (2003) (explaining that the discrimination older women experience as 
a result of the intersection of age and sex is more than a mere combination of sex discrimination and 
age discrimination and that they are treated worse than older men and younger women). This is par-
ticularly visible in the television industry, where in 1985, only 3% of female news anchors were over 
forty, compared to the 48% of male news anchors over forty. See id. at 94. Attractive attorneys earn 
more than less-attractive attorneys, with the pay gap widening between five and fifteen years of prac-
tice. See id. at 95–96 (citing Elizabeth M. Adamitis, Appearance Matters: A Proposal to Prohibit 
Appearance Discrimination in Employment, 75 WASH. L. REV. 195, 195 (2000)) (noting that the cor-
relation between attractiveness, age, and compensation will disproportionately affect women). 
 4 Frappied v. Affinity Gaming Black Hawk, LLC, 966 F.3d 1038, 1055 (10th Cir. 2020). Of the 
approximately sixty laid off workers, about thirty-three were women and nineteen were women over 
forty years old. Frappied v. Affinity Gaming Black Hawk, LLC, No. 17-cv-01294, 2018 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 104796, at *2 (D. Colo. June 22, 2018), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 966 F.3d 1038 (10th Cir. 
2020). Shortly after the layoffs, the defendant casino hired about twenty-four new workers, none of 
whom were women over forty. Frappied, 966 F.3d at 1055. 
 5 Frappied, 966 F.3d at 1045. The plaintiffs consisted of eight older women and one older man. 
Id. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits sex discrimination in employment, and the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) prohibits employment discrimination against 
workers over forty years old. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (prohibiting 
employers from discriminating against current or potential employees based on sex); ADEA, 29 
U.S.C. §§ 623(a), 631(a) (prohibiting employers from discriminating against current or potential em-
ployees based on age). 
 6 See Frappied, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104796, at *7–8 (rejecting the Title VII sex-plus-age 
discrimination claim because the plaintiffs admitted they could not bring an independent sex discrimi-
nation claim under Title VII). The court primarily dismissed the sex-plus-age claim because it viewed 
it as a backup claim in the event that the plaintiffs’ claim under the ADEA, which only alleged age 
discrimination, failed. See id. at *7 (preventing the plaintiffs from moving forward with their Title VII 
claim of sex-plus-age discrimination). 
 7 966 F.3d at 1048. Other circuit courts had confronted sex-plus-age claims before, but none had 
specifically ruled on the viability of sex-plus-age claims under Title VII. See, e.g., Gorzynski v. Jet-
Blue Airways Corp., 596 F.3d 93, 110 (2d Cir. 2010) (refraining from deciding whether an age-plus-
sex claim was cognizable after determining that the plaintiff had a viable claim based solely on age); 
Bryant v. Int’l Sch. Servs., Inc., 675 F.2d 562, 573 & n.18 (3d Cir. 1982) (denying that a sex-plus 
claim was applicable based on the facts in the case). Sex-plus-age claims refer to claims of discrimina-
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Part I of this Comment discusses the background of Title VII, the devel-
opment of the “sex-plus” doctrine, and the facts and procedural history of 
Frappied.8 Part II details the legislative history and prior applications of Title 
VII and the ADEA, the varied district court stances regarding the viability of 
sex-plus-age claims, and relevant analysis from the Supreme Court in Bos-
tock.9 Finally, Part III argues that the Tenth Circuit decision was correct in 
light of the Supreme Court’s 2020 decision in Bostock v. Clayton County and 
public policy considerations.10 
I. TITLE VII, “SEX-PLUS” DISCRIMINATION, AND FRAPPIED 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers from dis-
criminating on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.11 Since 
Title VII’s enactment, courts have confronted claims that employers discrimi-
nated because of the intersection of a protected class and another factor.12 Sec-
tion A of this Part provides a history and description of Title VII.13 Section B 
outlines the interpretation of Title VII discrimination claims based upon sex 
and an additional factor.14 Section C provides the facts and holding of the 
Tenth Circuit’s 2020 case, Frappied v. Affinity Gaming Black Hawk, LLC.15 
A. Title VII 
Congress initially passed Title VII in 1964 to forbid employers from dis-
criminating against their employees because of sex, and it later amended Title 
                                                                                                                      
tion based on the combination of sex and age under Title VII, whereas age-plus-sex claims refer to the 
same intersectional discrimination brought under the ADEA. See Gorzynski, 596 F.3d at 110 (distin-
guishing between age-plus-sex claims under the ADEA and sex-plus-age claims under Title VII). 
 8 See infra notes 11–55 and accompanying text. 
 9 See infra notes 56–92 and accompanying text. 
 10 See infra notes 93–117 and accompanying text. 
 11 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). 
 12 See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 252 (1989) (permitting plaintiffs to bring 
Title VII claims alleging discrimination because of the combination of sex and another factor), super-
seded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074, as recognized in 
Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Assoc. of Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009 (2020) (noting that Con-
gress, in enacting the 1991 Civil Rights Act, replaced Price Waterhouse’s motivating factor test with 
its own); Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971) (explaining that refusing to hire 
women with pre-school-age children could still constitute discrimination in violation of Title VII even 
though the employer did not discriminate against all women); Jefferies v. Harris Cnty. Cmty. Action 
Ass’n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1032 (5th Cir. 1980) (allowing the plaintiff to bring a Title VII claim alleging 
that their employer discriminated against them because of a combination of sex and race). 
 13 See infra notes 16–24 and accompanying text. 
 14 See infra notes 25–38 and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra notes 39–55 and accompanying text. 
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VII when it passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991.16 The amendment clarified 
that an employer has violated Title VII if a plaintiff can show that race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin was a “motivating factor” in an adverse em-
ployment action, even if it was not the sole basis for the decision.17 
One type of Title VII claim, a disparate treatment claim, requires a plain-
tiff to prove that an employer intended to discriminate.18 The plaintiff will be 
successful if there is direct and unambiguous evidence of intent to discrimi-
nate.19 In the absence of such evidence, courts apply the three-step burden-
shifting framework established in 1973 by the U.S. Supreme Court in McDon-
nell Douglas Corp. v. Green.20 First, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie 
case by showing that the four elements of a Title VII employment discrimina-
tion claim are met.21 The plaintiff must show that (1) they belong to one of the 
protected classes listed in Title VII; (2) they were qualified for their job; (3) 
                                                                                                                      
 16 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1), 2000e-2(m) (clarifying that as long as an employee’s position 
in a protected class was one of the reasons for an adverse employment practice, that practice is dis-
crimination in violation of Title VII). 
 17 See id. (prohibiting employers from discriminating because of a combination of a protected 
characteristic and other factors); see also Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1739–40 (2020) 
(finding that, even without considering the 1991 amendment to Title VII, the employer violated Title 
VII because the plaintiff’s sex was one of the reasons for the employment decision). 
 18 See, e.g., Marc Chase McAllister, Extending the Sex-plus Discrimination Doctrine to Age Dis-
crimination Claims Involving Multiple Discriminatory Motives, 60 B.C. L. REV. 469, 474 (2019) (de-
scribing the difference between disparate impact and disparate treatment discrimination claims). Dis-
parate impact occurs when a practice appears neutral on its face and is not necessary for the operation 
of business, but it ultimately discriminates on the basis of a protected trait. Disparate Impact, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 1. Disparate treatment, in contrast, requires intent to discrim-
inate on the basis of race, sex, national origin, age, or disability. Disparate Treatment, id. 
 19 See Porter, supra note 3, at 82 (noting that an employer is liable for discrimination if the plain-
tiff can prove direct evidence of discriminatory intent). If a plaintiff can present direct evidence of 
discrimination, courts apply the “mixed motives” test that the U.S. Supreme Court developed in Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, in 1989. 490 U.S. 228, 252 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074, as recognized in Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Assoc. of Afr. 
Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009 (2020) (noting that the 1991 Civil Rights Act removed the ability 
of the defendant to raise lack of but-for causation as an affirmative defense once discrimination has 
been established as a motivating factor); see DeAngelo v. DentalEZ, Inc., 738 F. Supp. 2d 572, 584 
(E.D. Pa. 2010) (denying the defendant employer’s motion for summary judgment for an ADEA age 
discrimination claim and sex-plus-age Title VII claim and noting that if there is direct evidence of 
discrimination, the “mixed motives” test from Price Waterhouse is appropriate). In mixed-motive 
cases, the employer acts for multiple reasons and lacks one decisive motive. See Price Waterhouse, 
490 U.S. at 260 (White, J., concurring) (distinguishing mixed-motive cases from pretext cases). Direct 
evidence of an intent to discriminate is rare and can include an employer’s unambiguous statement 
that they fired the employee because she was a woman. Porter, supra note 3, at 81. Direct evidence 
does not have to be so explicit, however, and can instead also include words that demonstrate an em-
ployer’s bias against a group that Title VII protects, such as an employer sharing their belief that 
women belong in the home. See id. at 81–82 (providing examples of what constitutes direct evidence 
of discrimination). 
 20 411 U.S. 792, 802, 804 (1973) (delineating the three-step framework for establishing an em-
ployer’s discriminatory intent through indirect evidence). 
 21 Id. at 802. 
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their employer terminated them despite their qualifications; and (4) the em-
ployer did not eliminate their job after the employer terminated their employ-
ment.22 If the plaintiff is successful, the burden shifts to the employer to pro-
vide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory motive for terminating employment.23 If 
the employer is able to do so, the plaintiff has a final opportunity to prove that 
the legitimate motive the employer cited is pretextual.24 
B. “Sex-Plus” Discrimination 
Sex-plus discrimination is when an employer discriminates against an 
employee because of a combination of sex and another factor.25 The Supreme 
Court of the United States first recognized the viability of a sex-plus discrimi-
nation claim under Title VII in the 1971 case, Phillips v. Martin Marietta 
Corp., where it concluded that discriminating against women with pre-school-
age children violated Title VII even though the employer did not discriminate 
against women in general.26 Since then, lower courts have further developed 
sex-plus jurisprudence to permit other sex-plus claims, including sex-plus-
                                                                                                                      
 22 See Frappied v. Affinity Gaming Black Hawk, LLC, 966 F.3d 1038, 1056 (10th Cir. 2020) 
(noting that the McDonnell Douglas factors for establishing a prima facie case are flexible); Kendrick 
v. Penske Transp. Servs., 220 F.3d 1220, 1229–30 (10th Cir. 2000) (applying the McDonnell Douglas 
burden-shifting paradigm); see also McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 804 (establishing the three-
step burden-shifting framework to establish an employer’s discriminatory intent). A plaintiff has es-
tablished a prima facie case if they have met their burden of presenting a rebuttable presumption in 
their favor. Prima Facie, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 1. 
 23 See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 (describing the burden-shifting framework that courts 
apply when there is no direct evidence of discrimination). 
 24 See id. at 804 (describing the final part of the three-step burden-shifting framework for a Title 
VII disparate impact claim); see also Frappied, 966 F.3d at 1059 (summarizing the third step of the 
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework and disagreeing with the district court’s conclusion 
that the plaintiffs did not show pretext); Garrett v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 305 F.3d 1210, 1217 (10th 
Cir. 2002) (applying the third step of the McDonnell Douglas framework and providing examples of 
the ways plaintiffs can show pretext). 
 25 See Arnett v. Aspin, 846 F. Supp. 1234, 1238 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (allowing plaintiff’s argument 
that the employer discriminated against a subset of the protected class, even though the employer did 
not discriminate against the entire protected class). Arnett v. Aspin, a 1994 case in the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania, involved an employer who filled two open positions with women under forty, pass-
ing over the forty-nine-year-old female plaintiff for both opportunities. Id. at 1236. The plaintiff 
claimed that all of the employees selected for the position had been either women under forty or men 
over forty. Id. 
 26 See 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971) (explaining that an employer’s discrimination against only the 
subset of women that had pre-school-age children could still violate Title VII); Back v. Hastings on 
Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 118 (2d Cir. 2004) (clarifying that the term “sex plus” 
was developed to indicate that Title VII claims will not necessarily fail if only a subclass of a protect-
ed group faced discrimination); see also Sprogis v. United Air Lines, 444 F.2d 1194, 1199 (7th Cir. 
1971) (concluding that an employer requiring women, but not men, to be unmarried is sex discrimina-
tion under Title VII). 
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marital status, sex-plus-race, and sex-plus-age claims.27 Notably, in sex-plus 
claims, the “plus” factor does not need to be another protected class.28 Rather, 
it need only relate to either an immutable characteristic or to the exercise of a 
fundamental right.29 
Until 2020, no federal appellate court had determined whether a plaintiff 
could bring a sex-plus-age claim under Title VII.30 Some district courts have 
found that plaintiffs may bring a sex-plus-age discrimination claim under Title 
VII.31 The main distinction between sex-plus-age claims and other sex-plus 
                                                                                                                      
 27 See Jefferies v. Harris Cnty. Cmty. Action Ass’n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1032 (5th Cir. 1980) (permit-
ting the plaintiff to bring a sex-plus-race claim under Title VII); Sprogis, 444 F.2d at 1199 (permitting 
a plaintiff to bring a sex-plus-marital status claim under Title VII); Arnett, 846 F. Supp. at 1241 (E.D. 
Pa. 1994) (permitting a plaintiff to bring a sex-plus-age claim under Title VII). 
 28 See, e.g., Phillips, 400 U.S. at 544 (permitting a sex-plus claim for women who are parents of 
pre-school-age children); Coleman v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 108 F.3d 1199, 1203 (10th 
Cir. 1997) (holding that Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against a specific group of 
women, even if it did not discriminate against all women), abrogated by Frappied, 966 F.3d at 1047. 
 29 See Jefferies, 615 F.2d at 1035 (allowing plaintiffs to allege a Title VII violation based on the 
intersection of sex and race); Willingham v. Macon Tel. Pub. Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1091–92 (5th Cir. 
1975) (holding that employer grooming policies limiting the length of hair allowed on males did not 
implicate an immutable characteristic or exercise of a fundamental right and, therefore, was not a 
protected sex characteristic); Arnett, 846 F. Supp. at 1241 (reasoning that a sex-plus-age claim should 
be permissible because age is an immutable characteristic). Immutable characteristics are physical 
traits that a person cannot change, such as race, sex, and national origin. See Willingham, 507 F.2d at 
1091 (holding that employers may not discriminate on the basis of an immutable characteristic or 
fundamental right); Arnett, 846 F. Supp. at 1241 (considering age an immutable characteristic). Fun-
damental rights are “a significant component of liberty” and include some rights to privacy, such as 
marriage and parenthood. Fundamental Right, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 1; see, e.g., 
Phillips, 400 U.S. at 544 (permitting a claim of discrimination on the basis of sex and being the parent 
of a pre-school-age child, which is the exercise of a fundamental right). 
 30 See Frappied, 966 F.3d at 1047 & nn.5–6 (noting that, although no circuit courts had addressed 
the applicability of Title VII to sex-plus-age claims, the district courts that had ruled on the issue were 
divided); see, e.g., Gorzynski v. JetBlue Airways Corp., 596 F.3d 93, 110 (2d Cir. 2010) (declining to 
make a finding about the viability of an age-plus-sex claim under the ADEA after having found a 
viable claim based on age alone); Bryant v. Int’l Sch. Servs., Inc., 675 F.2d 562, 573 & n.18 (3d Cir. 
1982) (acknowledging the existence of sex-plus claims under Title VII, but denying that such a claim 
was applicable in this case). 
 31 See Frappied, 966 F.3d at 1047 n.6 (identifying several district court opinions that held that 
Title VII permitted sex-plus-age claims, while also acknowledging that district courts did not unani-
mously hold this view); see, e.g., Cooper v. Corr. Corp. of Am., No. 15-CV-00755, 2015 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 134025, at *9 (D. Colo. Oct. 1, 2015) (acknowledging the possibility of sex-plus-age discrimi-
nation claims); DeAngelo v. DentalEZ, Inc., 738 F. Supp. 2d 572, 584 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (permitting 
sex-plus-age claims of discrimination); Gorski v. Myriad Genetics, No. 06-11631, 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 48110, at *3–4 (E.D. Mich. July 3, 2007) (refusing to find that sex-plus-age claims are not 
cognizable); McGrane v. Proffitt’s Inc., No. C 97-221, 2000 WL 34030843, at *7 (N.D. Iowa Dec. 26, 
2000) (recognizing sex-plus-age claims under Title VII); James v. Teleflex, Inc., No. CIV.A. 97-1206, 
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20400, at *26 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 23, 1998) (noting that other courts in the district 
had found sex-plus-age claims permissible); Hall v. Mo. Highway & Transp. Comm’n, 995 F. Supp. 
1001, 1005 (E.D. Mo. 1998) (allowing the plaintiff to proceed on a sex-plus-age discrimination 
claim), aff’d on other grounds, 235 F.3d 1065 (8th Cir. 2000). But see, e.g., Bauers-Toy v. Clarence 
Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 10-CV-845, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 193758, at *19 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2015) 
(rejecting the viability of sex-plus-age claims under Title VII). 
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claims is that Congress has separately addressed age discrimination in the 
ADEA.32 For this reason, some courts hesitate to expand Title VII to include 
age as a “plus” factor, despite an established sex-plus doctrine.33 
Under the ADEA, employers may not discriminate against employees 
older than forty because of their age.34 The Supreme Court has interpreted the 
ADEA to require that, for an employer to be liable, age must have a “determi-
native influence” on an adverse employment outcome.35 This form of strict 
but-for causation differs from the standard traditionally used in Title VII cases, 
which has always required only that a protected class be one but-for cause of 
an adverse employment action.36 The strict standard for causation has also pre-
vented a majority of lower courts from recognizing age-plus claims under the 
ADEA.37 As a result, some courts have prohibited plaintiffs from bringing sex-
plus-age claims under Title VII, reasoning that Congress envisioned that plain-
tiffs would use the ADEA to address age discrimination, rather than leverage 
the lower causation requirement in Title VII as a backup age discrimination 
claim.38 
                                                                                                                      
 32 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (explicitly prohibiting employers from discriminating against work-
ers over the age of forty). But see Frappied, 966 F.3d at 1048 (dismissing defendant’s argument that a 
plaintiff cannot bring a sex-plus-age claim under Title VII because the ADEA provides relief for age 
discrimination).  
 33 See, e.g., Bauers-Toy, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 193758, at *19 (dismissing the possibility of a 
sex-plus-age claim under Title VII). 
 34 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(a), 631(a). Congress did not intend for the ADEA to protect the relatively 
young from employment discrimination. See Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 
590–91 (2004) (noting that Congress intended for the ADEA to protect older workers from employ-
ment discrimination that benefits their relatively younger counterparts). Congress also did not intend 
to force employers to provide special treatment to older workers. See Berry v. Gen. Motors Corp., 838 
F. Supp. 1479, 1500 (D. Kan. 1993) (noting that the ADEA does not require employers to continue to 
employ older workers), aff’d, 56 F.3d 1233 (10th Cir. 1995). 
 35 See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993) (requiring that age be a “determina-
tive factor” for a plaintiff to prevail on a disparate treatment claim); see, e.g., Gross v. FBL Fin. 
Servs., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009) (requiring the plaintiff to prove that age was “the but-for” cause of 
the employer’s adverse action to prove an ADEA claim). Courts have interpreted the ADEA’s re-
quirement that an employer acted “because of” age to require plaintiffs to demonstrate that age was 
the “reason” for the adverse employment action. Gross, 557 U.S. at 176 (citing Hazen Paper Co., 507 
U.S. at 610). 
 36 See, e.g., Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971) (permitting a Title VII 
claim of discrimination against mothers of pre-school-age children, even though not all women were 
discriminated against). Sex was a but-for cause because fathers of pre-school-age children were not 
discriminated against. See id. at 543 (noting that the employer was not considering mothers of pre-
school-age children for employment, despite employing men with preschool-age children). 
 37 See Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1739–40 (2020) (applying a looser but-for cau-
sation standard when applying the original, unamended Title VII language to the facts); McAllister, 
supra note 18, at 493 (reporting that at least eight federal district courts have rejected age-plus claims 
under the ADEA). A but-for cause is an element that is necessary to cause an event. Cause, BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 1. 
 38 See McAllister, supra note 18, at 494 (discussing the Western District of New York’s 2015 
opinion, in Bauers-Toy, that rejected the possibility of a sex-plus-age claim under Title VII); see 
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C. Factual Background and Procedural History of Frappied 
On July 21, 2020, shortly after the Supreme Court decided the landmark 
Title VII case Bostock v. Clayton County, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals 
became the first circuit court to decide that Title VII permits sex-plus-age 
claims.39 Defendant Affinity Gaming Black Hawk purchased the Golden Mardi 
Gras Casino in Black Hawk, Colorado in March of 2012 and took over day-to-
day operations that November.40 At that point, the defendant required all exist-
ing employees to re-apply for their jobs, and the plaintiffs were re-hired.41 Pri-
or to their termination, all nine plaintiffs successfully performed their job re-
quirements.42 All nine plaintiffs were over forty years old, and eight of them 
were women.43 
In January of 2013, the defendant had laid off about sixty of the 106 em-
ployees at the casino and posted a Craigslist ad for fifty-nine open positions 
during the same time period.44 The new management’s explanations for the 
layoffs were varied and inconsistent.45 The defendant provided some former 
employees with reasons for their terminations, such as the employee failing to 
pass the probationary period or that they were not what the defendant was 
looking for.46 Some were given no reason at all.47 
                                                                                                                      
Frappied v. Affinity Gaming Black Hawk, LLC, No. 17-cv-01294, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104796, at 
*7–8 (D. Colo. June 22, 2018) (refusing to allow plaintiffs to “attempt to work-around statutory dic-
tates” by bringing a second claim of age discrimination under Title VII in addition to under the 
ADEA), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 966 F.3d 1038 (10th Cir. 2020). 
 39 See 140 S. Ct. at 1741 (holding that the language of Title VII in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) 
prohibits employers from discriminating based in part on sex); Frappied v. Affinity Gaming Black 
Hawk, LLC, 966 F.3d 1038, 1048 (10th Cir. 2020) (holding that plaintiffs can succeed on a sex-plus-
age claim under Title VII). 
 40 See Frappied, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104796, at *2 (providing the timeline of the defendant’s 
purchase of and control over the casino). 
 41 See id. (describing the defendant’s re-application requirement). 
 42 See id. at *2–3 (noting that the plaintiffs each performed their job functions and followed the 
“Genuine Service” philosophy that the defendant put in place around January 2013, prior to the 
layoffs). 
 43 Frappied, 966 F.3d at 1045. 
 44 See Frappied, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104796, at *4–5 (summarizing the timing and extent of 
the layoffs and new hiring, which included about twenty-four new workers to replace the approxi-
mately sixty workers who were laid off). 
 45 See id. (offering a range of explanations that the defendants provided to some plaintiffs for the 
layoffs and noting that others received no explanation at all). 
 46 See id. (providing the defendant’s purported reasons for laying off the plaintiffs). An employee 
reported seeing a ranked list of employees based on age, seniority, and work ability on the desk of a 
director at the casino. Id. at *3. Employee actions that Affinity deemed problematic during the proba-
tionary period included using profanity in front of a customer and making mistakes filling out forms 
like tip sheets and counts. Frappied, 966 F.3d at 1059–60. 
 47 Frappied, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104796, at *4 (noting that the casino management did not 
know the reasons for each plaintiff’s termination). 
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The plaintiffs’ presentation of the number and demographics of employ-
ees that the layoffs affected was inconsistent but still provided some probative 
value for claims of discrimination.48 The plaintiffs intended for the statistics to 
demonstrate two things: first, that older people in general were more likely to 
be laid off, and second, that the defendant discriminated against older women 
in particular.49 The eight women plaintiffs brought disparate impact and dis-
parate treatment sex-plus-age claims under Title VII.50 The U.S District Court 
for the District of Colorado dismissed the plaintiffs’ sex-plus-age disparate im-
pact and disparate treatment claims because it found that plaintiffs could not 
bring sex-plus-age claims under Title VII.51 
The plaintiffs appealed to the Tenth Circuit, which reversed the district 
court’s finding and instead held that plaintiffs can bring sex-plus-age claims 
under Title VII.52 Despite noting that the ADEA exists to address age-related 
employment discrimination, the Tenth Circuit reasoned that legislative intent is 
more important than drawing an artificial line between types of discrimination 
claims.53 The court found that by passing the ADEA, Congress tried to broaden 
protections against employment discrimination to include older workers rather 
than to narrow the scope of Title VII.54 The Tenth Circuit also relied on Bos-
                                                                                                                      
 48 See Frappied, 966 F.3d at 1053, 1055 (finding that the statistics, even though not clearly pre-
sented, bolstered the plaintiffs’ allegation of discrimination). The defendant originally employed about 
twenty-two women over the age of forty, and it laid off about eighteen of them. Frappied, 2018 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 104796, at *5. The defendant employed about eighteen men over the age of forty and laid 
off about ten of them. Id. at *4–5. Of the approximately thirty-three women laid off, about fourteen 
were over forty. See id. at *5 (summarizing the facts, which suggested that at least nineteen of the 
thirty-three laid-off women were younger than forty). In January and February of 2013, the defendant 
hired about twenty-four new workers to replace the employees it terminated in January. Id. Of those 
new hires, three men and no women were over forty years old, and fifteen of them, or seventy-one 
percent, were in their twenties at the time of hire. Frappied, 966 F.3d at 1055. The exact numbers are 
not clear because the plaintiffs presented inconsistent and contradictory statistics. Id. at 1053. 
 49 See Frappied, 966 F.3d at 1051 (describing and analyzing the statistics that the plaintiffs used 
to support their discrimination claims). The Tenth Circuit found plaintiffs’ allegations of discrimina-
tion against older women conclusory and concluded that the plaintiffs’ statistics had only plausibly 
shown that the defendant’s layoffs were possibly motivated by age or sex. Id. at 1051, 1053. 
 50 Id. at 1051. 
 51 See Frappied, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104796, at *7–8, *13 (holding that the plaintiffs were not 
allowed to bring a sex-plus-age claim). The district court judge perceived the plaintiffs’ sex-plus-age 
claim under Title VII as “an attempt to have a spare bullet” in the event that their ADEA age discrim-
ination claim failed. Id. at *7. The judge also pointed to the different scopes of liability for Title VII 
and the ADEA and refused to permit plaintiffs to leverage the different standards to get around the 
limits that Congress imposed. Id. at *8. 
 52 See Frappied, 966 F.3d at 1049 (recognizing sex-plus-age claims under Title VII). 
 53 See id. at 1048 (reasoning that Congress intended to expand employee protections when it 
amended Title VII, so sex-plus-age claims are permissible even if some plaintiffs would be able to 
bring both an ADEA and Title VII claim for the same incident). 
 54 See 29 U.S.C. § 621 (declaring the intent of Congress to broaden protections against age dis-
crimination for older workers); Frappied, 966 F.3d at 1048 (discussing Congress’s policy aims in 
passing the ADEA). 
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tock, in which the Supreme Court recently declared that an employer violated 
Title VII if the reason they intentionally fired an employee was at all related to 
sex.55 
II. TITLE VII VERSUS THE ADEA 
On July 21, 2020, in Frappied v. Affinity Gaming Black Hawk, LLC, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit became the first circuit court to 
determine whether Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 allows sex-plus-
age claims, an issue dividing the federal district courts below.56 Section A of 
this Part provides a brief history of Title VII and the ADEA.57 Section A will 
also show the textual analysis that courts have conducted when deciding 
whether sex-plus and age-plus claims, respectively, are cognizable claims.58 
Section B presents the different standards of causation that courts have applied 
to claims under Title VII and the ADEA.59 Section C provides a summary of 
the Frappied court’s analysis and ultimate conclusion that Title VII permits 
plaintiffs to bring sex-plus-age claims of discrimination.60 Finally, Section D 
provides an overview of the Supreme Court of the United States’ 2020 holding 
and analysis in Bostock v. Clayton County that affirmatively states the proper 
standard of causation for similar Title VII cases.61 
A. History of Title VII and the ADEA 
Congress passed Title VII as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to pre-
vent employers from discriminating against employees “because of” their 
membership in a protected class.62 Congress later passed the ADEA in 1967 
and has since amended it several times, including in the Civil Rights Act of 
                                                                                                                      
 55 See Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1741 (2020) (holding that an employer has 
violated Title VII if they intentionally fire an employee “based in part on sex”); Frappied, 966 F.3d at 
1045 (noting that, under Bostock, an employer has still violated Title VII even if a factor that Title VII 
does not protect was more important to the employer’s decision than sex). 
 56 See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)–(m) (prohibiting employment discrim-
ination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin); 966 F.3d 1038, 1047–48 (10th Cir. 
2020) (holding that plaintiffs may bring sex-plus age claims of discrimination under Title VII). 
 57 See infra notes 62–67 and accompanying text. 
 58 See infra notes 66–67 and accompanying text. 
 59 See infra notes 68–74 and accompanying text. 
 60 See infra notes 75–87 and accompanying text. 
 61 See infra notes 88–92 and accompanying text. 
 62 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Title VII protects employees from em-
ployment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Id. Representative 
Howard Smith, reportedly intending to block the bill from passing, added sex to the list of traits af-
forded protection under Title VII. See CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DE-
BATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 115–18 (1985) (describing Repre-
sentative Howard Smith’s failed attempt to sufficiently decrease support for Title VII to prevent Con-
gress from passing it). 
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1991.63 Congress also amended Title VII in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and 
added that an employer may not establish an employment practice motivated 
by a protected trait, even if they also considered other factors.64 When Con-
gress amended Title VII, however, it did not add a similar motivating factor 
test to the ADEA.65 Although courts recognized the sex-plus doctrine before 
the 1991 amendment to Title VII, they used the new “motivating factor” test in 
Title VII to deny age-plus claims under the ADEA.66 Courts have used Con-
gress’s failure to amend the ADEA to justify different burdens of persuasion on 
plaintiffs and to reach different conclusions about whether plaintiffs may bring 
mixed-motive cases under Title VII and the ADEA.67 
                                                                                                                      
 63 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (prohibiting employers from using employment practices that dis-
criminate on the basis of age). 
 64 See Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (amending Title VII to explicitly author-
ize mixed-motive claims of discrimination); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989) 
(holding that, to avoid liability, a defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that even 
without considering the plaintiff’s gender, it would have made the same choice), superseded by stat-
ute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074, as recognized in Comcast Corp. v. 
Nat’l Assoc. of Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009 (2020) (noting that the 1991 Civil Rights Act 
removes this affirmative defense from employers). 
 65 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (authorizing mixed-motive Title VII claims); 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) 
(prohibiting employment discrimination because of age); see also Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 557 U.S. 
167, 174 (2009) (comparing the legislative history of Title VII and the ADEA). 
 66 See Gross, 557 U.S. at 174–75 (concluding that plaintiffs cannot bring age-plus claims under 
the ADEA because it, unlike Title VII, has no provision authorizing mixed-motive claims). But see 
Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971) (declining to rule out the possibility of a 
sex-plus claim under Title VII); Jefferies v. Harris Cnty. Cmty. Action Ass’n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1032 
(5th Cir. 1980) (allowing a sex-plus-race claim under Title VII); Sprogis v. United Air Lines, 444 
F.2d 1194, 1199 (7th Cir. 1971) (permitting a claim of sex-plus-marital status under Title VII). 
 67 See McAllister, supra note 18, at 475–76 (comparing different courts’ approaches to Title VII 
and ADEA claims based on the combination of sex and age); see, e.g., Gross, 557 U.S. at 174–75 
(requiring that age be the but-for cause of discrimination under the ADEA). The original language of 
the ADEA closely mapped the language of Title VII by preventing an employer from discriminating 
against an employee “because of . . . age.” Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (declaring it unlawful 
“for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
ployment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin”), with 29 U.S.C. 
§ 623(a) (prohibiting “an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or other-
wise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privi-
leges of employment, because of such individual’s age”). Courts have reasoned that because Congress 
did not similarly amend the ADEA, it did not intend to provide relief for age-plus claims of discrimi-
nation. See, e.g., Gross, 557 U.S. at 174 (holding that Title VII and the ADEA have different burdens 
of persuasion, which prevents Title VII decisions from applying to ADEA cases). But see Frappied v. 
Affinity Gaming Black Hawk, LLC, 966 F.3d 1038, 1048 (10th Cir. 2020) (rejecting the defendant’s 
argument that because Title VII and the ADEA were designed differently and demand different bur-
dens of proof, Title VII should not permit sex-plus-age claims). The U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in 
2009, in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, imposed a burden on a plaintiff bringing an age discrimina-
tion claim to prove that age was the only factor that the employer considered when it acted. See McAl-
lister, supra note 18, at 476 (describing the implications of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Gross); see 
also Gross, 557 U.S. at 174 (restricting plaintiffs’ ability to bring age discrimination claims to in-
stances of discrimination that age exclusively motivated).  
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B. Differing Standards of Causation 
In 1989, the Supreme Court held in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins that 
plaintiffs could bring sex-plus claims under Title VII.68 Nonetheless, an em-
ployer could avoid liability if it could prove by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that it would have taken the same action without considering a charac-
teristic that Title VII protects.69 Since the 1991 amendment to Title VII, how-
ever, it is possible for plaintiffs to prevail if sex is merely a motivating factor 
for an adverse employment decision.70 Employers can be liable even if they 
relied more heavily on another factor when making the decision.71 
Despite the nearly identical language of Title VII and the ADEA, courts 
have been hesitant to recognize age-plus discrimination under the ADEA.72 
Rather than adopting a version of the sex-plus doctrine that was emerging prior 
to the 1991 amendment to Title VII, many courts interpreted the ADEA to re-
quire age to be “the reason” an employer acted.73 Thus, courts often require 
claims under the ADEA to prove that age is the but-for cause of the adverse 
employment action—rather than a but-for cause—to be successful, despite 
courts never interpreting Title VII to require that a protected trait be the sole 
but-for cause of discrimination.74 
                                                                                                                      
 68 See 490 U.S. at 258 (finding that gender played a motivating part in the decision not to promote 
the plaintiff). 
 69 Id. (holding that employers may avoid liability if they are able to show, by a preponderance of 
the evidence, that they would have taken the same action even if they had not discriminated against 
the employee). 
 70 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (allowing plaintiffs to prevail on a Title VII discrimination claim 
if one of the traits Title VII protects motivated the employer). 
 71 See id. (holding an employer liable if a protected class motivated them when taking an em-
ployment action, even when the protected class was not the sole reason the employer acted); Bostock 
v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1741 (2020) (holding that if the employee’s protected class plays a 
part in an adverse employment decision, the employer has violated Title VII). 
 72 See Famighette v. Rose, No. 17-cv-2553, 2018 WL 2048371, at *14 (E.D.N.Y. May 2, 2018) 
(dismissing age-plus claim brought under the ADEA); Bauers-Toy v. Clarence Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 
10-CV-845, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 193758, at *19 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2015) (same); Thompson v. 
City of Columbus, No. 12-cv-01054, 2014 WL 1814069, at *29–30 (S.D. Ohio May 7, 2014) (same); 
Cartee v. Wilbur Smith Assocs., No. 08-4132, 2010 WL 1052082, at *12 (D.S.C. Mar. 22, 2010) 
(same); McKinney v. City of Hawthorne, No. CV08-07, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128845, at *2 n.2 
(C.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2008) (same). 
 73 See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009) (requiring age to be the but-for 
cause of the adverse employment action). But see Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., 681 F.3d 
312, 318–19 (6th Cir. 2012) (allowing discrimination claims if the protected trait was a, rather than 
the, but-for cause); Jones v. Okla. City Pub. Sch., 617 F.3d 1273, 1278 (10th Cir. 2010) (rejecting the 
idea that Gross raised evidentiary requirements for plaintiffs bringing ADEA claims by requiring 
them to prove that age was the only reason for the adverse employment action). 
 74 See Gross, 557 U.S. at 175–76 (requiring age to be the but-for cause of discrimination in an 
ADEA claim); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989) (permitting a sex-plus claim 
under Title VII prior to the introduction of the motivating factor test), superseded by statute, Civil 
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074, as recognized in Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l 
Assoc. of Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009 (2020) (noting that the 1991 Civil Rights Act 
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C. The District Court Split and the Tenth Circuit’s Ruling 
Although the sex-plus doctrine for Title VII claims is well established, the 
reluctance of a majority of federal district courts to acknowledge age-plus dis-
crimination claims under the ADEA has prevented some courts from recogniz-
ing sex-plus-age claims under Title VII.75 Several district courts have ex-
pressed concern that permitting plaintiffs to bring a sex-plus-age claim under 
Title VII would allow them to prevail on a claim of age discrimination when 
they would not be able to succeed under the ADEA.76 Congress intended for 
the ADEA to provide protection against age discrimination in employment, so 
these courts have understood sex-plus-age Title VII claims to effectively pro-
vide plaintiffs with two chances to prevail on what amounts to the same 
claim.77 
On the other hand, the district courts that have allowed sex-plus-age dis-
crimination claims under Title VII have argued that Title VII and the ADEA 
address different harms.78 Therefore, some district courts have said that a sex-
plus-age claim under Title VII and an age discrimination claim under the 
ADEA can coexist without unfairly providing plaintiffs two chances to argue 
the same claim.79 These courts have also reasoned that allowing plaintiffs the 
opportunity to pursue these claims fulfills the purpose of the sex-plus doctrine, 
                                                                                                                      
established a new motivating factor test). But see EEOC v. DynMcDermott Petroleum Operations Co., 
537 F. App’x 437, 448 (5th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (authorizing age-plus claims under the ADEA); 
Leal v. McHugh, 731 F.3d 405, 414–15 (5th Cir. 2013) (permitting mixed-motive claims of discrimi-
nation by finding that the district court had misinterpreted Gross as requiring age to be the sole cause, 
rather than one but-for cause); Lewis, 681 F.3d 312, 321 (allowing an age-plus-disability claim of 
discrimination). 
 75 See supra note 72 and accompanying text (noting some of the district court cases that have 
prohibited plaintiffs from bringing age-plus discrimination claims under the ADEA). 
 76 See Frappied v. Affinity Gaming Black Hawk, LLC, No. 17-cv-01294, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
104796, at *7–8 (D. Colo. June 22, 2018) (refusing to allow a sex-plus-age claim of discrimination 
under Title VII), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 966 F.3d 1038 (10th Cir. 2020); see, e.g., Kelly v. Drexel 
Univ., 907 F. Supp. 864, 875 n.8 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (rejecting the argument that the ADEA protects the 
subclass of older workers with disabilities). 
 77 See, e.g., Frappied, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104796, at *7–8 (rejecting the plaintiff’s sex-plus-
age discrimination claim because it would give plaintiffs the ability to prevail on an age discrimina-
tion claim under Title VII even if they would be unsuccessful under the ADEA); Bauers-Toy, 2015 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 193758, at *19 (rejecting the possibility of age-plus-sex claims by reasoning that the 
ADEA and Title VII cover age discrimination and sex discrimination separately, with two separate 
standards and remedies). 
 78 See Gorzynski v. JetBlue Airways Corp., 596 F.3d 93, 109–10 (2d Cir. 2010) (acknowledging 
that age discrimination is distinct from sex discrimination and that when both are present courts can-
not neatly separate the two components). 
 79 See U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, SECTION 2 THRESHOLD ISSUES (2009) (noting 
that intersectional discrimination can be based on traits that separate Equal Employment Opportunity 
statutes protect); see, e.g., Arnett v. Aspin, 846 F. Supp. 1234, 1240 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (finding the dis-
tinction between sex-plus-age cases and other sex-plus cases in which the other factor is not separately 
protected irrelevant). 
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even when Congress separately protected the “plus” factor the way it protected 
age under the ADEA.80 
The Tenth Circuit was the first circuit court to directly address and choose 
a side of the district court split regarding the viability of sex-plus-age claims 
under Title VII.81 Noting that other courts have recognized sex-plus claims 
when the “plus” factor is not itself protected under Title VII, the Frappied 
court did not find any difference between those sex-plus claims and a sex-plus-
age claim that would warrant denying the viability of a sex-plus-age claim.82 
The court rejected the defendant’s argument that courts should bar sex-plus-
age claims because the ADEA exists to separately address employment age 
discrimination.83 It held that permitting a sex-plus-age claim would not allow 
plaintiffs to circumvent the requirements of the ADEA because Title VII and 
the ADEA exist to address two distinct harms.84 Therefore, permitting a sex-
plus-age claim under Title VII does not allow plaintiffs to bypass the require-
ments that the ADEA sets out.85 The court recognized “intersectional” discrim-
ination and noted that some people experience a form of discrimination based 
on multiple factors that is distinct from discrimination based on those factors 
individually.86 Lastly, the court reasoned that sex-plus-age claims honored 
Congress’s intent because it designed the ADEA to broaden protections against 
employer discrimination rather than to limit the application of Title VII.87 
                                                                                                                      
 80 See Arnett, 846 F. Supp. at 1240 (permitting a sex-plus-age claim when Congress has separate-
ly protected the plus factor). One purpose of Title VII is to protect employees from sex discrimination, 
so these courts opined that, even though the ADEA prohibits age discrimination, courts should permit 
plaintiffs to argue that the discrimination was based on the combination of traits as long as the statute 
under which a plaintiff is arguing protects one of the traits. See Frappied v. Affinity Gaming Black 
Hawk, LLC, 966 F.3d 1038, 1047–48 (10th Cir. 2020) (finding no reason to separate sex-plus-age 
claims from other sex-plus claims courts had recognized). 
 81 See Frappied, 966 F.3d at 1048 (acknowledging that it would be the first circuit court to decide 
whether Title VII sex-plus-age claims are permissible and ultimately concluding that they are). 
 82 See id. at 1048 (reasoning that because courts have permitted other sex-plus claims under Title 
VII, sex-plus-age claims should also be cognizable). 
 83 Id. (dismissing the defendant’s argument that because the ADEA addresses age-related em-
ployment discrimination claims, Title VII cannot address age-related claims). 
 84 Id. (noting that the ADEA and Title VII address different types of discrimination, with the 
ADEA protecting workers from discrimination based on age and Title VII protecting older women 
from discrimination based on sex and possibly another factor). 
 85 Id. 
 86 See id. at 1049 (citing Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: 
A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 
1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 150, https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=
1052&context=uclf [https://perma.cc/5QGF-CN7C]) (noting that recognition of intersectional dis-
crimination is necessary to understand and address all impermissible discrimination). When employ-
ers discriminate against older women but not older men, they are violating Title VII by relying on sex 
stereotypes. Id. 
 87 Id. at 1048. 
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D. The Supreme Court’s But-For Standard of Causation  
Analysis in Bostock 
On June 15, 2020, the Supreme Court ruled in Bostock v. Clayton County 
that employers who discriminate against employees because of gender identity 
or sexual orientation are necessarily engaging in sex discrimination in violation 
of Title VII.88 In that opinion, the Supreme Court analyzed only the original lan-
guage of Title VII that prevents discrimination “because of . . . sex.”89 The Court 
did not rely on the motivating factor test introduced in the 1991 amendment to 
Title VII.90 Instead, when describing the but-for test of causation that the “be-
cause of” language of Title VII incorporates, the Court concluded that something 
is a but-for cause if changing that factor would change the outcome.91 Even if 
there are multiple but-for causes for a particular event, liability attaches if at least 
one of those but-for causes is a protected class under Title VII.92 
III. FRAPPIED CORRECTLY REMAINED CONSISTENT WITH BOSTOCK  
AS WELL AS GENERAL POLICY GOALS 
In 2020, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in Frappied v. 
Affinity Gaming Black Hawk, LLC, correctly ruled that Title VII permits sex-
plus-age complaints.93 Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2020 decision in 
Bostock v. Clayton County, other courts should similarly find sex-plus-age 
claims permissible under Title VII.94 Not only was Frappied a correct inter-
pretation of Bostock, but it was also correct as a policy matter because it al-
lows plaintiffs to bring intersectional discrimination claims that separate 
                                                                                                                      
 88 Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1741 (2020). If an employer fires a male for being 
attracted to men, but would not fire a female for being attracted to men, the employer has discriminat-
ed on the basis of sex. See id. (explaining why discrimination based on sexual orientation necessitates 
impermissible sex discrimination). If an employer fires a female-identifying employee who was a 
male at birth but would not fire a female-identifying employee who was identified as a female at birth, 
they have discriminated because of sex. See id. (clarifying why discrimination on the basis of gender 
identity involves sex discrimination). 
 89 Id. at 1739–40. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. at 1739 (concluding that the legislative intent necessitates a but-for cause analysis that tests 
to see whether the presence or absence of a particular element changes the outcome). To illustrate this, 
the Court provided the example of a company policy of discrimination against women who are Yan-
kees fans. Id. at 1742. If an employer fires women who are Yankees fans but not men who are Yan-
kees fans, the employer is taking an adverse employment action “because of sex.” Id. 
 92 Id. at 1739 (clarifying that employers cannot simply point to another contributing factor to 
avoid liability for the discriminatory action). In Bostock, the Court noted that Congress has taken steps 
to make the standard lower by introducing a “motivating factor” test. Id. at 1739–40 (citing Civil Rights 
Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)). 
 93 See 966 F.3d 1038, 1048 (10th Cir. 2020) (holding that sex-plus-age Title VII claims are cog-
nizable). 
 94 See 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1741 (2020) (holding that an employer violated Title VII if they discrimi-
nated on the basis of gender identity or sexual orientation). 
II.-200 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:E. Supp. 
claims of age and sex discrimination would not otherwise adequately ad-
dress.95 
The Bostock Court interpreted and applied the language in Title VII that 
prohibits employment discrimination “because of . . . sex.”96 The Court did 
not look to the motivating factor test when assessing the claims of discrimi-
nation on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity.97 Courts have 
historically used the analogous language in the ADEA that makes it illegal 
for employers to discriminate “because of . . . age” to justify requiring a 
higher standard of causation for ADEA claims than for claims brought under 
Title VII.98 Courts previously reasoned that the inconsistent standard of cau-
sation was permissible, if not required, because Congress amended Title VII 
in 1991 to specifically authorize mixed-motive claims, whereas it did not add 
similar language to the ADEA.99 Because the Supreme Court clarified that an 
employer has violated Title VII if a protected class was a but-for cause—as 
opposed to the but-for cause—of the adverse employment action, courts 
should apply the same standard to claims brought under the ADEA.100 
Plaintiffs have been able to bring sex-plus claims for decades, with 
courts requiring only that one factor in the employment discrimination be a 
trait that Title VII protects.101 Sex-plus-age claims pre-dated the 1991 
                                                                                                                      
 95 See id. at 1739 (permitting plaintiffs to bring sex discrimination claims under Title VII even if 
sex is not the only factor the employer used to discriminate); Frappied, 966 F.3d at 1048 (holding that 
plaintiffs can bring sex-plus-age claims under Title VII). 
 96 See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1739 (analyzing the original language of Title VII found in the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)). 
 97 See id. at 1739–40 (noting that the facts did not require analysis under the “motivating factor” 
test that Congress added to Title VII in 1991). 
 98 See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (prohibiting age-related employment discrimination); see, e.g., Gross v. 
FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 174–76 (2009) (requiring age to be the but-for cause of discrimi-
nation under the ADEA). 
 99 See Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (protecting against employment discrimi-
nation due to a combination of a protected trait and other factors); 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (disallowing em-
ployers from engaging in age-related discriminatory employment practices); see, e.g., Gross, 557 U.S. 
at 174 (comparing the language of Title VII and the ADEA with a focus on the motivating factor test that 
Congress added to Title VII to explicitly authorize mixed-motive claims). 
 100 See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1739 (allowing for the possibility of multiple but-for causes for an 
adverse employment action). The Supreme Court concluded that an employer has violated Title VII if 
they discriminated on the basis of sex and another factor, and to reach this conclusion the Court only 
relied on the original language of Title VII. See id. at 1739–40 (noting that an employer has violated 
Title VII if sex was one of the reasons for an adverse employment action). This language mirrors the 
language in the ADEA, which should permit courts to allow claims that an employer discriminated on 
the basis of age and another factor. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (protecting workers over forty from age-
related employment discrimination); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (prohibiting employment discrimination 
because of sex); Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1739–40 (relying on the original language of Title VII to allow 
claims in which sex is just one of multiple but-for causes of the discrimination). 
 101 See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989) (describing and permitting 
mixed-motive claims under Title VII), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 
102-166, 105 Stat. 1074, as recognized in Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Assoc. of Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 
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amendment to Title VII, which clarified that an employer was in violation of 
Title VII if an employer considered a protected trait in an adverse employ-
ment action, even if it was not the deciding factor.102 The Bostock Court, hav-
ing applied the “because of . . . sex” language from Title VII to discrimina-
tion claims, found that an employer violated Title VII if sex was one but-for 
cause of the discrimination.103 Courts should lower the current “sole cause” 
standard of causation some courts apply in ADEA cases to permit age dis-
crimination claims if age is one but-for cause of the discrimination.104 The 
statutory language, mirroring that of Title VII, makes it illegal for employers 
to discriminate “because of . . . age.”105 With a lowered standard of causa-
tion, age-plus-sex claims of discrimination would be permissible for the 
same reasons courts have permitted sex-plus-age claims Title VII.106 
The Supreme Court’s analysis in Bostock logically should also lower the 
standard courts apply in ADEA claims and allow plaintiffs to prevail on a 
claim when age is one but-for cause of discrimination.107 This extension of 
Bostock would effectively erase the policy concerns some courts have ex-
pressed about considering sex-plus-age claims under Title VII.108 Plaintiffs 
will no longer be forced to argue claims of employment discrimination, in 
which age at least partially motivated an employer, under two laws with dif-
                                                                                                                      
140 S. Ct. 1009 (2020) (noting that the 1991 Civil Rights Act imposes a motivating factor test on 
discrimination claims); Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 543 (1971) (permitting a sex-
plus claim under Title VII before Congress amended Title VII to include the motivating factor test). 
Between the enactment of Title VII and the 1991 amendment that introduced the motivating factor 
test, the Supreme Court ruled that plaintiffs could prevail even when a class Congress protected under 
Title VII was not the sole reason an employer discriminated against them in an employment decision. 
See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258 (finding that the employer could have violated Title VII if the 
plaintiff’s gender affected their assessment of her as a manager). 
 102 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (prohibiting mixed motive employment discrimination); Price Wa-
terhouse, 490 U.S. at 258 (recognizing that an employer violated Title VII if a protected characteristic 
motivated an employment decision). 
 103 Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1739–40. To reach this conclusion, the Court only analyzed the original 
language of Title VII, not including the 1991 amendment. Id. 
 104 See id. at 1739 (relying on the original language of Title VII when determining that a protect-
ed characteristic need only be one but-for cause for an employer to have violated the statute). 
 105 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of sex); 29 
U.S.C. § 623(a) (prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of age); Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 
1739 (holding that Title VII prohibits employment discrimination that is based in part on sex). 
 106 See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1739–40 (holding that Congress prohibited employers from taking 
adverse action if sex is one but-for cause prior to 1991 when it amended Title VII). 
 107 See id. (holding that the original language of Title VII prohibits sex discrimination, even when 
sex is not the only reason for the adverse employment action). 
 108 See id. (allowing Title VII sex discrimination claims when sex is one but-for cause of discrim-
ination); see, e.g., Frappied v. Affinity Gaming Black Hawk, LLC, No. 17-cv-01294, 2018 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 104796, at *7–8 (D. Colo. June 22, 2018), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 966 F.3d 1038 (10th Cir. 
2020) (asserting that the ADEA and Title VII have different scopes of liability). 
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ferent standards of causation.109 Courts would no longer have to grapple with 
discrimination based on the intersection of sex and age that they could previ-
ously only analyze as distinct sex and age discrimination claims under Title 
VII and the ADEA, respectively.110 Consistent interpretations of Title VII and 
the ADEA in mixed-motive claims of discrimination would permit courts to 
recognize sex-plus-age claims under Title VII without reservations.111 
Moreover, the Frappied court’s interpretation of Bostock rightfully ex-
pands the viability of employment discrimination claims to cover scenarios 
in which an employer discriminates on the basis of more than one trait. 112 
Discrimination based on sex plus age is not the same as discrimination based 
on sex or age alone.113 The intersection of these two protected traits results in 
                                                                                                                      
 109 See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1739–40 (finding that sex does not need to be the only but-for cause 
of discrimination for a viable Title VII claim); Frappied v. Affinity Gaming Black Hawk, LLC, 966 
F.3d 1038, 1048 (10th Cir. 2020) (rejecting the defendant’s argument that Congress imposed a limit 
on a plaintiff’s ability to bring Title VII claims by enacting the ADEA). Congress structured Title VII 
and the ADEA almost identically before the 1991 amendment to Title VII, and, before that time, 
courts permitted sex-plus claims under Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (prohibiting sex dis-
crimination in employment); 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (prohibiting age discrimination in employment); 
see, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989) (permitting sex-plus claims prior to 
Congress’s adoption of the motivating factor test for Title VII claims), superseded by statute, Civil 
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074, as recognized in Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Assoc. 
of Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009 (2020) (noting that Congress, in enacting the 1991 Civil 
Rights Act, adopted a motivating factor test to judge discrimination claims). There is no reason for courts 
to exclude age-plus claims under the ADEA while allowing them under Title VII, given the nearly iden-
tical statutory language even before the 1991 amendment. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (making em-
ployment discrimination in which race, color, religion, sex, or national origin are a but-for cause un-
lawful); 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (making it unlawful for employers to engage in age-related discrimina-
tion); see, e.g., Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258 (permitting mixed-motive claims under Title VII 
when the language was nearly identical to the current language of the ADEA). The Bostock Court’s 
clarification of the standard of causation that Title VII requires should effectively reset the incorrect 
case law that has developed and permit age-plus claims under the ADEA and sex-plus-age claims 
under Title VII. See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1739–40 (requiring only that a Title VII-protected trait be 
one but-for cause, rather than the sole but-for cause, of an adverse employment action). 
 110 See Frappied, 966 F.3d at 1049 (noting the need for courts to recognize intersectional discrim-
ination). 
 111 See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1739 (clarifying the requirements for a Title VII claim). But see 
Frappied, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104796, at *7–8 (refusing to allow plaintiffs to bring a sex-plus-age 
claim of discrimination because of the different standards Congress supposedly created for Title VII 
and the ADEA). 
 112 See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1739 (noting that employers violated Title VII if sex was one but-
for cause of discrimination); Frappied, 966 F.3d at 1048 (holding that plaintiffs can bring sex-plus-
age discrimination claims under Title VII). 
 113 See Frappied, 966 F.3d at 1049 (citing Jourdan Day, Closing the Loophole: Why Intersection-
al Claims Are Needed to Address Discrimination Against Older Women, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 447, 474 
(2014)) (discussing discrimination based on the intersection of two separate characteristics). Discrimi-
nation against older women does not necessarily look like discrimination against younger women or 
older men, but rather, it may be motivated precisely because of a combination of age and sex. See 
Day, supra, at 474 (discussing the dilemma older women face when deciding whether to bring a dis-
crimination claim under Title VII or the ADEA when younger women and older men did not experi-
ence the discrimination). 
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a particular experience of discrimination that deserves appropriate legal 
treatment.114 Courts should not require plaintiffs who have experienced em-
ployment discrimination because of their age and sex to separately argue sex 
discrimination under Title VII and age discrimination under the ADEA.115 It 
can be difficult, if not impossible, for plaintiffs to neatly separate the types of 
discrimination they have experienced.116 Plaintiffs would also rarely be suc-
cessful in arguing an ADEA age discrimination claim if anything other than 
age motivated the employer because the inconsistent, and often improperly 
high, standard of causation courts have imposed requires age to be “the rea-
son” the employer acted.117 
CONCLUSION 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit’s 2020 ruling, in Frap-
pied v. Affinity Gaming Black Hawk, LLC, correctly held that plaintiffs could 
bring sex-plus-age claims under Title VII. This ruling was one of the first 
circuit court decisions interpreting the Supreme Court’s 2020 decision in 
Bostock v. Clayton County, which held that sex only needed to be one but-for 
cause of an adverse employment action for a plaintiff to bring a Title VII sex 
discrimination claim. Federal district courts had not reached a consensus re-
garding whether to allow sex-plus-age discrimination claims under Title VII, 
despite an established sex-plus doctrine. In Bostock, the Supreme Court clari-
fied that, even under the original language of Title VII, sex did not need to be 
the only but-for cause of discrimination for a plaintiff to prevail. The nearly 
                                                                                                                      
 114 See Frappied, 966 F.3d at 1049 (noting that discrimination based on the combination of two 
different traits is different from discrimination based on either of those two traits). Men tend to receive 
favorable treatment as they age, but women experience the opposite effect because employers tend to 
value women the most when they are young and attractive. See Porter, supra note 3, at 94 (discussing 
the difference in treatment that men and women receive as they age). 
 115 See Frappied, 966 F.3d at 1049 (noting that Congress intended for Title VII to protect against 
intersectional discrimination). 
 116 See id. (distinguishing discrimination based on a combination of age and sex from discrimina-
tion based solely on age). When employers discriminate against older women in particular, it is diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to successfully argue that the employer is either discriminating because of sex 
(because younger women will not be affected) or discriminating because of age (because older men 
will not be affected). See Porter, supra note 3, at 94–96 (noting that discrimination against older 
women is often based on the premium society has placed on youth and beauty, particularly for wom-
en). 
 117 See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 557 U.S. 167, 176–77 (2009) (requiring plaintiffs to prove that 
age was the but-for cause of age discrimination under the ADEA). Requiring plaintiffs who have truly 
been discriminated against by their employers for the combination of age and sex to separate their 
claim into an age discrimination claim and sex discrimination claim would be making it even more 
difficult for plaintiffs to prevail because there is no single but-for cause. See, e.g., Frappied, 966 F.3d 
at 1048 (recognizing that older women experience a type of discrimination that is distinct from a sim-
ple combination of sex and age discrimination). 
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identical language of the ADEA should also invoke this lighter standard for 
age discrimination’s but-for cause requirement. 
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